In 2006, Perruchet and Pacton (2006) asked whether implicit learning and statistical learning represent two approaches to the same phenomenon. This article represents an important follow‐up to their seminal review article. As in the previous paper, the focus is on the formation of elementary cognitive units. Both approaches favor different explanations on what these units consist of and how they are formed. Perruchet weighs up the evidence for different explanations and concludes with a helpful agenda for future research.

This paper reviews Deleuze’s theory of language in Logic of Sense, and Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of language in A Thousand Plateaus. In the ontology informed by the Stoics described in those books, human being and language do not exist separately but in a mixture of words and things. The author argues that this flattened ontology of surfaces is incommensurable with the ontology of depth used in conventional humanist qualitative methodology and recommends beginning new empirical inquiry with a concept instead (...) of with method and methodology. (shrink)

Wittgensteinian readings of Being and Time, and of the source of the intelligibility of Dasein''s world, in terms of language and the average everyday public practices of das Man are partly right and partly wrong. They are right in correcting overly individualist and existentialist readings of Heidegger. But they are wrong in making Heidegger into a proponent of language or everydayness as the final word on intelligibility and the way the world is disclosed to us. The everydayness of das Man (...) and language are partial sources of intelligibility but only insofar as they are comprehended within the greater unitary structure of care and temporality. Care and temporality constitute the foundational underpinnings for disclosure and the intelligibility ofthat wherein Dasein dwells. (shrink)

In response to Germain argument that evolution by natural selection has a limited explanatory power in cancer, Lean and Plutynski have recently argued that many adaptations in cancer only make sense at the tumor level, and that cancer progression mirrors the major evolutionary transitions. While we agree that selection could potentially act at various levels of organization in cancers, we argue that tumor-level selection is unlikely to actually play a relevant role in our understanding of the somatic evolution of human (...) cancers. (shrink)

In a recently published paper, we argued that theories of cultural evolution can gain explanatory power by being more pluralistic. In his reply to it, Dennett agreed that more pluralism is needed. Our paper’s main point was to urge cultural evolutionists to get their hands dirty by describing the fine details of cultural products and by striving to offer detailed and, when explanatory, varied algorithms or mechanisms to account for them. While Dennett’s latest work on cultural evolution does marvelously well (...) on the first point, it has only whet our appetite on the second. Accordingly, the present paper aims to show what an evolutionary explanation of culture that takes the variety of cultural evolution mechanisms seriously would look like. We will focus on the cultural evolution of social epistemic mechanisms and we will propose that Darwinian algorithms should be complemented with a cultural analogue of the error reduction mechanism proposed to account for human cognition, with a particular emphasis on the necessity to build independencies between different sub-systems in charge of tracking states of the world. To illustrate our point, we will present how the evolution of the legal system as epistemic systems can be understood as a process of building increasingly better independencies and how various criticisms of the actual legal system calls for building even more of them. (shrink)

Pierre Maquet1,2,6, Steven Laureys1,2, Philippe Peigneux1,2,3, Sonia Fuchs1, Christophe Petiau1, Christophe Phillips1,6, Joel Aerts1, Guy Del Fiore1, Christian Degueldre1, Thierry Meulemans3, André Luxen1, Georges Franck1,2, Martial Van Der Linden3, Carlyle Smith4 and Axel Cleeremans5.

As is often the case when scientific or engineering fields emerge, new concepts are forged or old ones are adapted. When this happens, various arguments rage over what ultimately turns out to be conceptual misunderstandings. At that critical time, there is a need for an explicit reflection on the meaning of the concepts that define the field. In this position paper, we aim to provide a reasoned framework in which to think about various issues in the field of distributed cognition. (...) We argue that both relevant concepts, distribution and cognition, must be understood as continuous. As it is used in the context of distributed cognition, the concept of distribution is essentially fuzzy, and we will link it to the notion of emergence of system-level properties. The concept of cognition must also be seen as fuzzy, but for a different reason: due to its origin as an anthropocentric concept, no one has a clear handle on its meaning in a distributed setting. As the proposed framework forms a space, we then explore its geography and visit famous landmarks. (shrink)

Criticisms and rejections of representationalism are increasingly popular in 4E cognitive science, and especially in radical enactivism. But by overfocusing our attention on the debate between radical enactivism and classical representationalism, we might miss the woods for the trees, in at least two respects: first, by neglecting the relevance of other theoretical alternatives about representationalism in cognitive science; and second by not seeing how much REC and classical representationalism are in agreement concerning basic and problematic issues dealing with mental content (...) and intentionality. In order to expand and exemplify these ideas, this paper presents two heterodox positions on intentionality and on the relations between content and representation. Special attention is paid to the way REC is rejecting these positions: I argue that this rejection reveals common assumptions with classical representationalism, but also undermines the coherence of REC’s conception of intentionality. (shrink)

Στον οπισθόδομο του ναού του Απόλλωνος στους Δελφούς, ένα μνημείο έχει αφήσει τα ίχνη του πάνω στην πλακόστρωση. Η ίδρυση του είναι σύγχρονη με την οικοδόμηση του ναού. Η παρουσία ενός μνημείου στο τμήμα αυτό ενός ναού είναι μοναδικό παράδειγμα * θα πρέπει να εξηγείται από κάποια τοπική ιδιομορφία. Αντιμετωπίζονται δύο υποθέσεις : πρόκειται είτε για ένα άγαλμα του Απόλλωνος αφιερωμένο από τους Αμφικτιονες ως αποζημίωση για την ιεροσυλία των Φωκαέων, είτε για τον ομφαλό. Η δεύτερη υπόθεση θα συμφωνούσε με (...) την πορεία του Παυσανία και, επιπλέον, δεν διαψεύδεται από τους λογαριασμούς οικοδόμησης του ναού. (shrink)

Μελέτη τεσσάρων ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν μελῶν, λαξευμένων δύο φορές στήν ἀρχαιότητα. Τά τρία πρῶτα προέρχονται ἀπό μνημεία τοῦ ἱεροῦ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς, τό τέταρτο ἀπό τό ἱερό τοῦ 'Απόλλωνα. 1. Λίθος ἀπό γεισήποδα τοῦ ἀρχαϊκοῦ ναοῦ τῆς 'Αθηνάς μέ ίχνη χρωμάτων. 2. Γωνιαῖος λίθος ἀπό τους τοίχους τοῦ Θησαυροῦ τῆς Μασσαλίας, σέ δεύτερη χρήση στήν ὕστερη ἀρχαιότητα, δυτικά ἀπό τό ἱερό τοῦ 'Απόλλωνα. 3. Λίθος ἐπιστυλίου τοῦ δωρικοῦ Θησαυροῦ, πού χρησιμοποιήθηκε στήν ἴδια περιοχή γιά δεύτερη φορά στά χριστιανικά χρόνια σάν γούρνα κοσμημένη μέ (...) σταυρό. Χρονολόγηση τοῦ δωρικοῦ Θησαυροῦ τῆς Μαρμαριᾶς καί τοῦ Θησαυροῦ τῶν 'Αθηναίων : γύρω στά 470/465 καί 485/480 π.Χ. ἀντίστοιχα. 4. Δωρικό πώρινο κιονόκρανο τῶν μέσων τοῦ 5ου αἰώνα π.Χ., ταύτιση ἀβέβαιη (Λέσχη τῶν Κνιδίων ;). (shrink)

1. — Delphes : Les bases campaniformes des Deïnoménides ne portaient pas directement de trépied, comme les cavités du lit d'attente et les textes l'avaient fait croire, mais une colonne de bronze sur laquelle se dressaient le trépied et la statue. Publication d'autres bases campaniformes analogues, que leur profil amène à rapprocher des bases de colonnes des palais perses. Étude d'un type apparenté, trois bases campaniformes tronquées, qui portaient des colonnes. Réexamen du socle attribué au trépied de Platées. Si les (...) blocs des deux assises circulaires et certains blocs des assises carrées avec des crampons en double-gamma, appartiennent bien à un même monument, la disparition de la 3e assise circulaire nous prive de tout élément pour savoir si et comment la colonne serpentine était fixée sur ce socle. Socle d'un trépied anonyme qui peut correspondre aux « morceaux importants d'un monument rond » du Journal de la grande fouille, trouvé entre le temple et l'autel. Autres trépieds. Le cippe des Tyrrhéniens ne portait pas de trépied. 2. — Péloponnèse : La seule base importante de trépied dans le Péloponnèse se trouve à Messène, au sommet de l'Ithôme. (shrink)

A presentation and discussion of Gottlob Frege's understanding of language, both natural and artificial, with close attention to his texts.

In “The Bioethics of Environmental Injustice: Ethical, Legal, and Clinical Implications of Unhealthy Environments,” Ray and Cooper (2024) advocate for environmental law efforts, with a focus on the...

Ce texte a déjà paru dans la mineure « Rythmanalyses » de la revue Multitudes, n° 46, 2011. Nous remercions la revue Multitudes et Pierre Sauvanet de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. Premier temps. Regardons pour commencer Young and Innocent : la dernière scène de ce film de jeunesse d'Alfred Hitchcock est un grand moment de cinéma — mais pas seulement. Comme souvent chez le réalisateur, la trame du film se noue autour de ce jeune homme, accusé (...) d'un meurtre qu'il n'a pas - Pour une éthique et une politique du rythme – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Part of the contents: 0Happiness and Theôria in Books I and X of the Nicomachean Ethics / Eudaimonia and Theôria within the 0Nicomachean Ethics / The Meaning of Bios in Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics / Approximation and Acting for an 0Ultimate End / Eudaimonia, Theôria, and the Choiceworthiness of Practical Wisdom / Aristotle on the Choice of Lives: Two Concepts of Self-Sufficiency / Eudaimonia and Contemplation in Aristotle’s Ethics / Theôria and Praxis in Aristotle’s Ethics / The Private Moral Life (...) of Aristotle’s Philosopher: A Defense of a Non-Intellectualist Interpretation of Nicomachean Ethics / Theoretical Life, Practical Life, and Happiness in Aristotle / The Best Life according to Aristotle : A Reconsideration / Theos, Theôria, and Therapeia in Aristotle’s Ethical Endings / Contemplation and Service of the God: The Standard for External Goods in Eudemian Ethics / 0Aristotelian Immortality.0. (shrink)

L'assise où se dressaient des statues devant le mur Sud du trésor des Athéniens est couramment appelée « socle marathonien » parce qu'elle porte une dédicace où figure le nom de Marathon. Pour les uns, cette dédicace est celle du trésor lui-même ; pour d'autres, le socle a été accolé à un monument bâti avant 490. La dédicace a été regravée, probablement au IIIe s. av. J.C. ; le texte regravé est en tout point identique à celui de la première (...) inscription, qui a laissé quelques traces, difficiles à dater. On s'est mépris sur la fonction du mot akrothinia dans la dédicace ; le socle ne portait pas un trophée constitué par des pièces du butin, mais des statues. Les fondations du trésor et la terrasse portant le socle ont été bâties en même temps, ce qui confirme que le trésor a été construit après 490. Il ne s'ensuit pas nécessairement que la dédicace du socle soit aussi celle du trésor ; il n'est pas sûr que Pausanias l'ait lue. (shrink)

P. Amandry, A propos de monuments de Delphes : questions de chronologie (I). p. 591-610 Dans leur entreprise de critique systématique de la chronologie traditionnellement admise pour l'art grec archaïque, Francis et Vickers ont mis en doute la date de 530-525 pour le trésor de Siphnos, à partir de divers arguments contestant l'interprétation ou la valeur du texte d'Hérodote, III 57-58, ou l'identification du trésor. Mais celle-ci est prouvée, avec une quasi-certitude, par un passage de Pausanias et par l'emploi avéré (...) de marbre siphnien. Les rapprochements faits par F. et V. entre le décor sculpté du trésor et le palais de Persépolis, ainsi que la supposition d'une symbolique anti-perse, sont au mieux gratuits, souvent inacceptables. (shrink)

The dissertation seeks to gain a comprehensive understanding of Frege's watershed work of logic, the 1879 Begriffsschrift . The treatise is the first since Aristotle's instauration of the discipline to have succeeded in completely recasting logic. Very generally stated, the dissertation aims at making explicit the conceptual origins of modern logic. To do that will require that each of the achievements of Concept-script be examined from one or more vantage points: either within the perspective of Frege's larger and guiding ambition, (...) that of providing a logical justification of arithmetic; or with respect to the horizon of modernity; or in relation to later developments in logical theory and the philosophy of language, developments stimulated, albeit not exclusively, by Frege's very work. The vantage point adopted in each case will depend on the nature of the topic and the extent to which it requires to be made explicit. One perspective will have preponderance, that of Frege's relationship to his early modern ancestors, a group that includes philosophers, scientists, and mathematicians. Since modernity is constituted in a nearly constant critical, if not polemical, relationship to the Ancients, they will also at times be drawn into the discussion. The elucidation of Frege's breakthrough work will be guided by the following thesis: Frege's attempt to justify arithmetic logically and the fine work of clarification he produced in actualizing this project; his discovery of function-theoretic logic and his fashioning of a concept-script ; and his critique of natural language and the attendant semantics developed over the course of that critique constitute an unfolding and an extension of the primacy of universal method over ontology that is the signature of modern inquiry. (shrink)

War has always been a problem that has plagued our existence, and begged for civility and restriction in its use. The idea behind engaging in war has often been based on assuring a place for peace in the not so distant future, whether the motivation was normative, as within the Just War Doctrine, or simply the hope that victory would lead to the end of organized violence. A group of scholars, intellectuals, and practitioners has been brought together in this volume (...) to posit an alternative route — through justice — to what has thus far been elusive for humankind: a durable peace among and between peoples. (shrink)

This chapter distinguishes Just Peace from its closest ‘moral’ neighbours — a stable peace and positive peace. Drawing on both consequentialist and deontological considerations, Allan develops an international ethical scale to evaluate different acts from a moral standpoint, with different levels of conflict as the baseline of ethical behavior. The more extreme the discord, the worse it is considered on the scale; the more harmonious, the better. Arguing that absolute unhappiness and absolute happiness are not of this world, Allan presents (...) eight intermediary moral situations, each being superseded by the next one in ethical terms: genocide, war, non-war, Just War, stable peace, Just Peace, positive peace, and Global Care. He develops an ethic of ‘global care’ based on feminist theories of care, religious and secular declarations on a global ethic, evolutionary theory arguments, and a critique of a liberal human rights approach. (shrink)

In this concluding chapter, Allan and Keller posit that Just Peace should be defined as a process resting on four necessary and sufficient conditions: thin recognition whereby the other is accepted as autonomous; thick recognition whereby identities need to be accounted for; renouncement, requiring significant sacrifices from all parties; and rule, the objectification of a Just Peace by a ‘text’ requiring a common language respecting the identities of each, and defining their rights and duties. This approach, based on a language-oriented (...) process amongst directly concerned parties, goes beyond liberal and culturalist perspectives. By moving beyond the idea of a peace founded on norms claiming universal scope, each side of a conflict has a place at the negotiating table to present their own perspective on what justice might entail. This inclusion into the decision-making process helps create the feeling of personal investment in the final negotiated product. In addition, negotiators need to work towards building a novel shared reality as well as a new common language to help foster an enduring harmony between previously clashing peoples. (shrink)